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A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games

Author

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  • Satoshi Masuya

    (Daito Bunka University)

  • Masahiro Inuiguchi

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

The payoff of each coalition has been assumed to be known precisely in the conventional cooperative games. However, we may come across situations where some coalitional values remain unknown. This paper treats cooperative games whose coalitional values are not known completely. In the cooperative games it is assumed that some of coalitional values are known precisely but others remain unknown. Some complete games associated with such incomplete games are proposed. Solution concepts are studied in a special case where only values of the grand coalition and singleton coalitions are known. Through the investigations of solutions of complete games associated with the given incomplete game, we show a focal point solution suggested commonly from different viewpoints.

Suggested Citation

  • Satoshi Masuya & Masahiro Inuiguchi, 2016. "A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games," Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 281-306, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:fuzodm:v:15:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10700-015-9229-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10700-015-9229-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Satoshi Masuya, 2023. "Two Approaches to Estimate the Shapley Value for Convex Partially Defined Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-15, December.
    2. Martin Cerny & Michel Grabisch, 2023. "Player-centered incomplete cooperative games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 23006, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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