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Licensing Life-Saving Drugs for Developing Countries: Evidence from the Medicines Patent Pool

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  • Schankerman, Mark
  • Galasso, Alberto

Abstract

We study the effects of a patent pool on the licensing and adoption of life-saving drugs in low- and middle-income countries. Using data on licensing and sales for HIV, hepatitis C and tuberculosis drugs, we show that there is an immediate and large increase in licensing by generic firms when a patent is included in the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP). This finding is robust to identification strategies to deal with endogeneity of MPP patents and countries. The impact of the MPP is especially large for small, non-Sub-Saharan countries. The impact on actual entry and sales, however, is much smaller than on licensing, which is due to geographic bundling of licenses by the MPP. More broadly, the paper highlights the potential of pools in promoting technology diffusion of biomedical innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Schankerman, Mark & Galasso, Alberto, 2020. "Licensing Life-Saving Drugs for Developing Countries: Evidence from the Medicines Patent Pool," CEPR Discussion Papers 15544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15544
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Shiri Mermelstein & Hilde Stevens, 2022. "TRIPS to Where? A Narrative Review of the Empirical Literature on Intellectual Property Licensing Models to Promote Global Diffusion of Essential Medicines," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/337220, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel, 2021. "Covid-19: Should intellectual property rights be challenged? [Covid-19 : doit-on remettre en question les droits de propriété intellectuelle?]," Post-Print hal-03212246, HAL.
    3. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2021. "Better than a compromise, a third way: Using patent pooling to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19," MPRA Paper 117765, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patents; Licensing; Patent pool; Pharmaceuticals; Hiv; Public health; Developing countries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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