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Better than a compromise, a third way: Using patent pooling to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19

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  • Billette de Villemeur, Etienne
  • Dequiedt, Vianney
  • Versaevel, Bruno

Abstract

In the debate on intellectual property rights induced by the Covid-19 pandemic, vaccines and treatments are typically referred to as simple products whose manufacturing specifications need only to be shared in order to increase production capacity and accelerate access to all, more specifically to low-income populations in the developing world. We contribute to this debate by taking into account the fact that the manufacture of innovative vaccines and treatments can involve multiple technologies whose patents are held by several entities. We propose an economic approach that it is more balanced than the polar options – on which the debate has focused – of either maintaining or suspending patents, without being reduced to a simple compromise between these two extremes. This “third way” is grounded in a model for the characterization of the performance of a patent pool mechanism, whose objective is to maximize access to medicinal products by licensing multiple technologies as a bundle to downstream manufacturers. The outcomes of the nonprofit patent pool are compared with those of two benchmark scenarios where either patent holders license their technologies separately, or where a profit-maximizing patent pool is involved. The analysis highlights the positive role that a non-profit organization such as the Medicines Patent Pool can play in the global governance of responses to the pandemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2021. "Better than a compromise, a third way: Using patent pooling to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19," MPRA Paper 117765, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:117765
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    3. Sandeep Juneja & Aastha Gupta & Suerie Moon & Stephen Resch, 2017. "Projected savings through public health voluntary licences of HIV drugs negotiated by the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP)," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(5), pages 1-15, May.
    4. T. V. Padma, 2021. "COVID vaccines to reach poorest countries in 2023 — despite recent pledges," Nature, Nature, vol. 595(7867), pages 342-343, July.
    5. Schankerman, Mark & Galasso, Alberto, 2020. "Licensing Life-Saving Drugs for Developing Countries: Evidence from the Medicines Patent Pool," CEPR Discussion Papers 15544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    access; pricing; vaccines; treatments; developing countries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy

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