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Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance

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  • Ferreira, Daniel
  • Li, Jin
  • Nikolowa, Radoslawa

Abstract

We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the two-way interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. Our main result is that the proof-of-work system leads to a situation where the governance of the blockchain is captured by a large firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferreira, Daniel & Li, Jin & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2019. "Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 13493, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13493
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    2. Lambrecht, Marco & Sofianos, Andis & Xu, Yilong, 2021. "Does mining fuel bubbles? An experimental study on cryptocurrency markets," Working Papers 0703, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    3. Niu, Baozhuang & Mu, Zihao & Cao, Bin & Gao, Jie, 2021. "Should multinational firms implement blockchain to provide quality verification?," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    4. Thong, Lik Hong, 2019. "A discussion on performance risk of Dunkin's Brand," MPRA Paper 97266, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2019.
    5. John E.H.J. FoEh & Diah Ayu Permatasari & Jhonni Sinaga, 2022. "Corporate Governance in Need of Reforms: What Areas of the System Should Be Reformed First and How?," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(4), pages 73-81.
    6. Fahad Asghar & Palwasha Farooq & Muhammad Nadim & Zain ul Abidin & Fazli Wadood, 2023. "Global Financial Crisis: A critical study on Role of Auditor’s and Stakeholder," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 9(2), pages 452-458.
    7. Cong, Lin William & Li, Ye & Wang, Neng, 2022. "Token-based platform finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 972-991.
    8. Igor Makarov & Antoinette Schoar, 2022. "Cryptocurrencies and Decentralised Finance," BIS Working Papers 1061, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Archana Saxena & Rajesh Singh & Anita Gehlot & Shaik Vaseem Akram & Bhekisipho Twala & Aman Singh & Elisabeth Caro Montero & Neeraj Priyadarshi, 2022. "Technologies Empowered Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG): An Industry 4.0 Landscape," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-17, December.
    10. Agostino Capponi & Sveinn Olafsson & Humoud Alsabah, 2021. "Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization?," Papers 2106.09783, arXiv.org.
    11. Bokolo Anthony Jnr., 2022. "Toward a collaborative governance model for distributed ledger technology adoption in organizations," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 276-294, June.
    12. Sonia Yasin & Muhammad Irfan & Muhammad Shaukat Malik & Fasiha Nargis, 2022. "The Relationship between Executive Remuneration and Organizations Efficiency," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 8(3), pages 59-70, December.
    13. Dutta, Pankaj & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Somani, Surabhi & Butala, Richa, 2020. "Blockchain technology in supply chain operations: Applications, challenges and research opportunities," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    14. Dongshu Jiang & ZhiXing Ni & Yuxiu Chen & Xue Chen & Chaohong Na, 2022. "Influence of Financial Shared Services on the Corporate Debt Cost under Digitalization," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-17, December.
    15. Quang Linh Huynh & Mohammad Enamul Hoque & Perengki Susanto & Waqas Ahmad Watto & Maryam Ashraf, 2022. "Does Financial Leverage Mediates Corporate Governance and Firm Performance?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-20, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Blockchain; Industrial ecosystem; Proof-of-work;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General

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