The political economy of fiscal transparency and independent fiscal councils
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- Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Randolph Sloof, 2017. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Transparency and Independent Fiscal Councils," IMF Working Papers 17/195, International Monetary Fund.
- Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Sloof, Randolph, 2017. "The political economy of fiscal transparency and independent fiscal councils," Working Paper Series 2091, European Central Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Debrun, Xavier, 2019. "Independent Fiscal Institutions in the European Union: Is Coordination Required?," MPRA Paper 93143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Luc Eyraud & Xavier Debrun & Andrew Hodge & Victor Duarte Lledo & Catherine A Pattillo, 2018. "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 18/04, International Monetary Fund.
- Antonio Fatás & Atish R. Ghosh & Ugo Panizza & Andrea F Presbitero, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," IMF Working Papers 19/101, International Monetary Fund.
- Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Fang, Xiangming & Kim, Young & Lledó, Victor & Mbaye, Samba & Zhang, Xiaoxiao, 2019.
"Independent fiscal councils: Recent trends and performance,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 53-69.
- Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Fang, Xiangming & Kim, Young & Lledo, Victor & MBaye, Samba & Zhang, Xiaoxiao, 2018. "Independent fiscal councils: recent trends and performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 12826, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Xiangming Fang & Young Kim & Victor Duarte Lledo & Samba Mbaye & Xiaoxiao Zhang, 2018. "Independent Fiscal Councils: Recent Trends and Performance," IMF Working Papers 18/68, International Monetary Fund.
- Debrun, Xavier & Jonung, Lars, 2019.
"Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 142-157.
- Debrun, Xavier & Jonung, Lars, 2018. "Under Threat: Rules-Based Fiscal Policy and How to Preserve It," Working Papers 2018:29, Lund University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywordscompetence; congruence; fiscal transparency; Independent fiscal councils; opportunistic bias; partisan bias; public debt;
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2017-08-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2017-08-06 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2017-08-06 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2017-08-06 (Positive Political Economics)
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