Improving Global Public Goods Supply through Conditional Transfers - The International Adaptation Transfer Riddle
In order to overcome the underprovision of global public goods various different policy approaches have been proposed. In the climate policy arena, international transfers are frequently seen as an effective means to raise the provision of the global public good ‘climate change mitigation’. This paper focuses on a specific type of international transfer that aims at raising mitigation while also reducing the damages from climate change: conditional adaptation support. Especially since the COP in Copenhagen 2009, preparations are on-going to significantly expand international transfers that help developing countries to adapt to climate change. While there are extensive discussions in the policy arena about the required amount of adaptation funding and the best ways to raise, manage and disburse these funds, hardly any attention is paid to the international allocative effects of these transfers. The answer to the question of ‘why’ international adaptation transfers are paid at all, is often relegated to fairness considerations only. As adaptation benefits are largely local and adaptation transfers reduce the recipients’ incentives to contribute to climate change mitigation, one would, however, expect at least unease in donor countries about plans to significantly expand international adaptation support. In this study, we compare two alternative conditional transfer schemes: one plainly subsidizes mitigation efforts, while the other provides adaptation support which is conditional on other agents’ mitigation contributions. Disregarding distributional and fairness aspects the paper evaluates and compares the allocative effects of either policy scheme. It is shown that while both policy schemes can be beneficial for developing as well as industrialized countries, this outcome relies strongly on the productivity of mitigation and adaptation technologies.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich|
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo-group.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tetsuo Ono, 1998. "Consumption externalities and the effects of international income transfers on the global environment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 255-269, October.
- Heike Auerswald & Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2011. "Adaptation, Mitigation and Risk-Taking in Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3320, CESifo Group Munich.
- K. K. Lancaster, 2010. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1385, David K. Levine.
- Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April.
- Udo Ebert & Heinz Welsch, 2011.
"Adaptation and Mitigation in Global Pollution Problems: Economic Impacts of Productivity, Sensitivity and Adaptive Capacity,"
V-332-11, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2011.
- Udo Ebert & Heinz Welsch, 2012. "Adaptation and Mitigation in Global Pollution Problems: Economic Impacts of Productivity, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(1), pages 49-64, May.
- Tol, Richard S. J. & Verheyen, Roda, 2004. "State responsibility and compensation for climate change damages--a legal and economic assessment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1109-1130, June.
- Buob, Seraina & Stephan, Gunter, 2011. "To mitigate or to adapt: How to confront global climate change," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-16, March.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2003:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Karen Pittel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013.
"International Climate Finance and Its Influence on Fairness and Policy,"
The World Economy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 419-436, 04.
- Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., 2013. "International Climate Finance and Its Influence on Fairness and Policy," Munich Reprints in Economics 19342, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Karen Pittel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2011. "International Climate Finance and its Influence on Fairness and Policy," Working Papers 2011-04, BC3.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
- Althammer, Wilhelm & Buchholz, Wolfgang, 1993. "Lindahl-equilibria as the outcome of a non-cooperative game : A reconsideration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 399-405, August.
- Sally Kane & Jason Shogren, 2000. "Linking Adaptation and Mitigation in Climate Change Policy," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 75-102, April.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011.
"Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 639-645, August.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011. "Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 639-645.
- Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, Junio.
- Clemens Heuson & Wolfgang Peters & Reimund Schwarze & Anna-Katharina Topp, 2012.
"Which mode of funding developing countries’ climate policies under the post-Kyoto framework?,"
Discussion Paper Series RECAP15
004, RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder).
- Heuson, Clemens & Peters, Wolfgang & Schwarze, Reimund & Topp, Anna-Katharina, 2012. "Which mode of funding developing countries' climate policies under the post-Kyoto framework?," UFZ Discussion Papers 10/2012, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
- Ingham, Alan & Ma, Jie & Ulph, Alistair, 2007. "Climate change, mitigation and adaptation with uncertainty and learning," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5354-5369, November.
- Ihori, Toshihiro, 1996. "International public goods and contribution productivity differentials," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 139-154, July.
- Ficre Zehaie, 2009. "The Timing and Strategic Role of Self-Protection," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 44(3), pages 337-350, November.
- W. M. Gorman, 1980. "A Possible Procedure for Analysing Quality Differentials in the Egg Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(5), pages 843-856.
- Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-55, May.
- Ekins, Paul, 1996. "How large a carbon tax is justified by the secondary benefits of CO2 abatement?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 161-187, June.
- Scott Barrett, 2008. "Climate treaties and the imperative of enforcement," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 239-258, Summer.
- Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74, pages 132.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.