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Lobbying for Education in a Two-sector Model

Author

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  • Debora Di Gioacchino
  • Paola Profeta

Abstract

In a two-period model, firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly, only one sector finds it profitable to offer monetary contribution and direct resources towards the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity and price in the two sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Debora Di Gioacchino & Paola Profeta, 2011. "Lobbying for Education in a Two-sector Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 3446, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3446
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Debora Di Gioacchino & Alina Verashchagina, 2017. "Mass media and attitudes to inequality," Working Papers in Public Economics 178, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    2. Ivo Bischoff & Julia Hauschildt, 2019. "Vocational schools as an instrument of interregional competition—Empirical evidence from German counties [Berufsschulen als Instrument im interregionalen Wettbewerb – Ergebnisse einer Analyse für d," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 39(1), pages 65-89, February.
    3. Debora Di Gioacchino & Paola Profeta, 2014. "Lobbying for Education in a Two-Sector Model," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 212-236, July.
    4. Debora Di Gioacchino & Laura Sabani & Simone Tedeschi, 2016. "Differences in education systems across OECD countries: the role ofeducation policy preferences in a hierarchical system," Working Papers in Public Economics 177, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    5. Richard Cothren & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2018. "Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 277-298, April.
    6. Ivo Bischoff & Julia Hauschildt, 2017. "Vocational Schools as an Instrument of Interregional Competition – Empirical Evidence from German Counties," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201722, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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