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The Management of Pay as the Influence of Collective Bargaining Diminishes

  • W Brown
  • P Marginson
  • J Welsh

The management of pay in Britain has changed substantially in recent years. The paper starts with a theoretical discussion of the extent to which individual employers can exercise discretion in the management of their employees' pay. It then examines the ways in which pay is used to secure productive effort. An analysis of the influence of trade unions leads on to an examination of the diminishing influence of collective bargaining in British pay determination. The implications of this are discussed for employer pay strategies, within and between firms, and internationally. It concludes with the consequences of diminishing trade union influence for the distribution of pay.

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File URL: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP213.pdf
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Paper provided by ESRC Centre for Business Research in its series ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers with number wp213.

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Date of creation: Sep 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp213
Note: PRO-2
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/

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  1. Hodgson, Geoff, 1982. "Theoretical and Policy Implications of Variable Productivity," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 213-26, September.
  2. Blau, Francine D & Kahn, Lawrence M, 1996. "International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: Institutions versus Market Forces," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 791-836, August.
  3. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00353892, HAL.
  4. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
  5. Stewart, Mark B, 1991. "Union Wage Differentials in the Face of Changes in the Economic and Legal Environment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(230), pages 155-72, May.
  6. Stephen Machin, 2000. "Union Decline in Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 38(4), pages 631-645, December.
  7. Machin, Stephen, 1997. "The decline of labour market institutions and the rise in wage inequality in Britain," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 647-657, April.
  8. Machin, Stephen, 1996. "Wage Inequality in the UK," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 47-64, Spring.
  9. Stewart, M.B., 1989. "Union Wage Differentials, Product Market Influences And The Division Of Rents," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 323, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  10. Stewart, Mark B, 1986. "Collective Bargaining Arrangements Closed Shops and Relative Pay," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 273, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  11. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J & Garrett, Mario D, 1990. "Insider Power in Wage Determination," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(226), pages 143-70, May.
  12. Richard B. Freeman, 1991. "How Much Has De-Unionisation Contributed to the Rise in Male Earnings Inequality?," NBER Working Papers 3826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Nolan, Peter & Brown, William, 1983. "Competition and Workplace Wage Determination," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 45(3), pages 269-87, August.
  14. repec:fth:prinin:287 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. William Brown & Simon Deakin & David Nash & Sarah Oxenbridge, 2000. "The Employment Contract: From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 38(4), pages 611-629, December.
  16. Paul Marginson & Keith Sisson, 1998. "European Collective Bargaining: A Virtual Prospect?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 505-528, December.
  17. Ramaswamy, Ramana & Rowthorn, Robert E, 1991. "Efficiency Wages and Wage Dispersion," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(232), pages 501-14, November.
  18. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-39, May.
  19. S Oxenbridge & S Deakin & W Brown & C Pratten, 2001. "Collective Employee Representation and the Impact of Law: Initial Response to the Employment Relations Act 1999," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp206, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  20. Weiss, Andrew & Landau, Henry J, 1984. "Wages, Hiring Standards, and Firm Size," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 477-99, October.
  21. David Card, 1992. "The Effect of Unions on the Distribution of Wages: Redistribution or Relabelling?," NBER Working Papers 4195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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