Using rewards and penalties to incentivize energy and water saving behaviour in agriculture – Evidence from a choice experiment in Punjab

The policy of free electricity since 1997 is hugely popular with farmers in Punjab who are its biggest beneficiaries. Successive Governments have either lacked the courage or willingness to pursue market oriented electricity sector reforms even though the adverse con-sequences are increasingly visible. Over the past few decades, experts have expressed concern over the rapidly receding level of the water table and forecast of desertification, as well as the financial burden on the electricity distribution utility and government. Withdrawing free electricity and charging a price for electricity is a huge challenge. This research aims to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for electricity and consider preferences for an annual free electricity limit with reward for meter installation and a novel incentive-penalty scheme designed to reward low consumption and discourage over-consumption. A discrete choice experiment assuming random probit and multinomial logit choice behaviour model is deployed to estimate the model parameters. We find that more than 82% of respondents are willing to accept an entitlement to a free electricity limit – with a reward for consuming less than this – rather than the current policy of free and unmetered electricity. We also find that the WTP for electricity increases with higher entitlements. Considering the WTP alone, the results suggest that increasing the electricity price can be acceptable to farmers. Further research is needed to develop a pricing strategy that considers the inter-relatedness between electricity entitlement, saving incentive and price.