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Students' Social Origins and Targeted Grade Inflation

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  • A. Tampieri

Abstract

Grade inflation or soft grading is a common feature of the educational systems of many countries. In this paper I analyse grade inflation in a setting in which students differ in social background, and the grading policy can be targeted according to student type. I consider a signalling game where firms decide whether to hire students and their salary after observing their grades and social background, a university can inflate grades, when students decide whether to attend university. A targeted grade inflation may have redistributive effects by raising the salary of students with disadvantaged social background, if their grades are less inflated than other students'.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Tampieri, 2011. "Students' Social Origins and Targeted Grade Inflation," Working Papers wp801, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp801
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Tim & Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Honest Grading, Grade Inflation and Reputation," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62051, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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