Systemic capital requirements
The credit risk that an individual bank poses to the rest of the financial system depends on its size, the type of exposures it has to the real economy, and its obligations to other institutions. This paper describes a system-wide risk management approach to calibrating individual banks’ capital requirements that takes into account these factors and which correspond to a policymaker’s chosen target for systemic credit risk. The optimisation strategy identifies the minimum level of aggregate capital for the system and its distribution across banks that are consistent with a chosen objective for systemic credit risk. This parameterises a trade-off between efficiency and stability.
|Date of creation:||13 Oct 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH|
Phone: +44 (0)171 601 4030
Fax: +44 (0)171 601 5196
Web page: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Elsinger, Helmut & Lehar, Alfred & Summer, Martin, 2005.
"Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment,"
817, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Helmut Elsinger & Alfred Lehar & Martin Summer, 2006. "Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(1), March.
- Prasanna Gai & Nigel Jenkinson & Sujit Kapadia, 2007. "Systemic risk in modern financial systems: analytics and policy design," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 156-165, March.
- Iman van Lelyveld & Franka Liedorp, 2004.
"Interbank Contagion in the Dutch Banking Sector,"
DNB Working Papers
005, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Larry Eisenberg & Thomas H. Noe, 2001. "Systemic Risk in Financial Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(2), pages 236-249, February.
- Admati, Anat R. & DeMarzo, Peter M. & Hellwig, Martin F. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 2010.
"Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive,"
2065, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2010. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_42, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Lelyveld, Iman van & Liedorp, Franka, 2006.
"Interbank Contagion in the Dutch Banking Sector: A Sensitivity Analysis,"
806, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Iman van Lelyveld & Franka Liedorp, 2006. "Interbank Contagion in the Dutch Banking Sector: A Sensitivity Analysis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(2), May.
- Piergiorgio Alessandri & Prasanna Gai & Sujit Kapadia & Nada Mora & Claus Puhr, 2009. "Towards a Framework for Quantifying Systemic Stability," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(3), pages 47-81, September.
- Upper, Christian, 2011. "Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 111-125, August.
- Celine Gauthier & Alfred Lehar & Moez Souissi, 2010. "Macroprudential Regulation and Systemic Capital Requirements," Staff Working Papers 10-4, Bank of Canada.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:0436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Media Team)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.