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The economics of cultural formation of preferences

  • Pichler, Michael

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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    This paper introduces a generalized representation of the formation of continuous preferences (which can reflect different intensities). The preference intensity that a child adopts is formed as the collective outcome of all role models for preference intensities - which are derived from the socioeconomic actions of adults - that it socially learns from. We then show how the adopted preference intensities induce preferences over socioeconomic choices. Finally, this cultural formation of preferences process is endogenized as resulting out of optimal parental socialization decisions. This framework thus endogenously determines the intergenerational evolution of preference intensities and the induced preferences.

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2316455/2319872
    File Function: First Version, 2010
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    Paper provided by Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University in its series Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers with number 431.

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    Date of creation: 16 Aug 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:431
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    3. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    4. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology," DELTA Working Papers 1999-13, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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    6. Galor, Oded & Moav, Omer, 2000. "Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth," Arbetsrapport 2000:5, Institute for Futures Studies.
    7. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "On the cultural transmission of preferences for social status," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 75-97, October.
    8. Pollak, Robert A, 1976. "Interdependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 309-20, June.
    9. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple-trait distributions," Post-Print halshs-00754392, HAL.
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    12. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa, 2003. "Empirical Models of Cultural Transmission," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 363-375, 04/05.
    13. Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003. "Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 909-968.
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    15. Hauk, Esther & Sáez-Martí, María, 2001. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Working Paper Series 564, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    16. Bruce Sacerdote, 2002. "The Nature and Nurture of Economic Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 344-348, May.
    17. Jan K. Brueckner & Oleg Smirnov, 2006. "Social Networks and the Convergence of Population Attributes: A Generalization," Working Papers 050630, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    18. Olcina, Gonzalo & Penarrubia, Concepcion, 2004. "Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 111-132, May.
    19. Bester, H. & Güth, W., 1994. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?," Discussion Paper 1994-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    20. Luisa Escriche & Gonzalo Olcina & Rosario Sánchez, 2004. "Gender discrimination and intergenerational transmission of preferences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 485-511, July.
    21. Jan K. Brueckner & Oleg Smirnov, 2007. "Workings Of The Melting Pot: Social Networks And The Evolution Of Population Attributes," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 209-228, 05.
    22. Mozaffar Qizilbash, 2009. "Well-Being, Preference Formation and the Danger of Paternalism," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-18, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
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