IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bge/wpaper/792.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Patent Collateral, Investor Commitment, and the Market for Venture Lending

Author

Listed:
  • Yael V. Hochberg
  • Carlos Serrano
  • Rosemarie H. Ziedonis

Abstract

The use of debt to finance risky entrepreneurial-firm projects is rife with informational and contracting problems. Nonetheless, we document widespread lending to startups in three innovation-intensive sectors and in early stages of development. At odds with claims that the secondary patent market is too illiquid to shape debt financing, we find that intensified patent trading increases the annual rate of startup lending, particularly for startups with more redeployable (less firm-specific) patent assets. Exploiting differences in venture capital (VC) fundraising cycles and a negative capital-supply shock in early 2000, we also find that the credibility of VC commitments to refinance and grow fledgling companies is vital for such lending. Our study illuminates friction-reducing mechanisms in the market for venture lending, a surprisingly active but opaque arena for innovation financing, and tests central tenets of contract theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Yael V. Hochberg & Carlos Serrano & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, 2014. "Patent Collateral, Investor Commitment, and the Market for Venture Lending," Working Papers 792, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:792
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/792.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008. "Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1635-1677.
    2. Harhoff, Dietmar, 2009. "The role of patents and licenses in securing external finance for innovation," EIB Papers 11/2009, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
    3. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    4. Yael V. Hochberg & Alexander Ljungqvist & Yang Lu, 2007. "Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 251-301, February.
    5. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies, 2008. "Financing the Entrepreneurial Venture," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 151-166.
    6. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-591, July.
    7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    8. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman & Carlos J. Serrano, 2011. "Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights," NBER Working Papers 17367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Alexander Ljungqvist & Matthew Richardson, 2003. "The cash flow, return and risk characteristics of private equity," NBER Working Papers 9454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ramana Nanda & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, 2010. "Financing Risk and Innovation," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-013, Harvard Business School, revised Jan 2014.
    11. Benmelech, Efraim & Bergman, Nittai K., 2009. "Collateral pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 339-360, March.
    12. Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle., 1976. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 41, University of California at Berkeley.
    13. Yael V. Hochberg & Alexander Ljungqvist & Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, 2014. "Informational Holdup and Performance Persistence in Venture Capital," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 102-152.
    14. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    15. Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, 2010. "The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of Entrepreneurship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1163-1194.
    16. Hoetker, Glenn & Agarwal, Rajshree, 2005. "Death Hurts, But It Isn't Fatal: The Postexit Diffusion of Knowledge Created by Innovative Companies," Working Papers 05-0100, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    17. Efraim Benmelech, 2009. "Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 1545-1584.
    18. Carlos J. Serrano, 2010. "The dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, pages 686-708.
    19. Kerr, William R. & Nanda, Ramana, 2009. "Democratizing entry: Banking deregulations, financing constraints, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 124-149, October.
    20. Gompers, Paul & Kovner, Anna & Lerner, Josh & Scharfstein, David, 2010. "Performance persistence in entrepreneurship," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 18-32, April.
    21. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Karthik Krishnan & Debarshi K. Nandy, 0. "How Does Venture Capital Financing Improve Efficiency in Private Firms? A Look Beneath the Surface," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 4037-4090.
    22. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman & Carlos J. Serrano, 2013. "Trading and enforcing patent rights," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 275-312, June.
    23. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Karthik Krishnan & Debarshi K. Nandy, 0. "How Does Venture Capital Financing Improve Efficiency in Private Firms? A Look Beneath the Surface," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 4037-4090.
    24. Stuart Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, 2013. "Of Smart Phone Wars and Software Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 67-86.
    25. Masako Ueda, 2004. "Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and Expropriation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 601-621, April.
    26. Manju Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2012. "On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(6), pages 2247-2293, December.
    27. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 1999. "Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," NBER Chapters,in: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, pages 19-60 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. Alessandro Gavazza, 2011. "The Role of Trading Frictions in Real Asset Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1106-1143.
    29. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, 2011. "Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 915-933.
    30. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, 2011. "Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 915-933.
    31. Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, 2002. "Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 169-197, February.
    32. David H. Hsu, 2004. "What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1805-1844, August.
    33. David H. Hsu, 2006. "Venture Capitalists and Cooperative Start-up Commercialization Strategy," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 204-219.
    34. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 519-540.
    35. Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, 2013. "The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 45-66.
    36. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    37. Matt Marx & Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, 2009. "Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 875-889.
    38. Hall, Bronwyn H & Ziedonis, Rosemarie Ham, 2001. "The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 101-128.
    39. Stulz, ReneM. & Johnson, Herb, 1985. "An analysis of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 501-521, December.
    40. Lerner, Josh, 1995. " Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 301-318, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ramana Nanda & William R. Kerr, 2015. "Financing Innovation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 445-462, December.
    2. Durufle, Gilles & Hellmann, Thomas F & Wilson, Karen, 2017. "From Start-up to Scale-up: Examining Public Policies for the Financing of High-Growth Ventures," CEPR Discussion Papers 12004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Joan Farre-Mensa & Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2016. "The Bright Side of Patents," NBER Working Papers 21959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Giovanni Dosi & Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Financial regimes, financialization patterns and industrial performances : preliminary remarks," Post-Print halshs-01418040, HAL.
    5. Joan Farre-Mensa & Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2017. "What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery”," NBER Working Papers 23268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mihaela Diaconu, 2016. "Determinants of Financing Decisions in Innovative Firms: A Review on Theoretical Backgrounds and Empirical Evidence," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 198-203, February.
    7. Huang, We-Chi & Chen, Ping-ho & Lai, Ching-Chong, 2016. "International R&D Funding and Patent Collateral in an R&D-Growth Model," MPRA Paper 74881, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. repec:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:545-561 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    entrepreneurial finance; financial intermediation; market for patents; venture capital; venture lending;

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:792. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/bargses.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.