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Notas sobre la Economía Política del Caribe Colombiano

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

  • Iván Higuera-Mendieta

Abstract

El persistente rezago del Caribe Colombiano en términos de desarrollo económico se debe en parte a la baja calidad de sus instituciones. Este trabajo hace una revisión de los estudios recientes sobre la economía política de la región y resalta algunos de los factores más relevantes. Entre estos se destacan los efectos de las transformaciones en la estructura económica regional, las reformas políticas y administrativas nacionales, la interdependencia entre la política regional y nacional, y el uso sistemático de la violencia. Las medidas disponibles tienden a reflejar el mal estado de las instituciones, siendo la región una de las peores calificadas en términos de desempeño fiscal, gobierno abierto y delitos electorales. A pesar de esto, la percepción de corrupción es relativamente baja y, en comparación con otras regiones, hay mayor tolerancia frente a algunas de estas prácticas. Esto podría estar reflejando un mayor grado de naturalización del fenómeno. ******* ABSTRACT: The Caribean region is persistently lagged behind in terms of economic development and this is partly due to the poor quality of institutions. This paper reviews recent literature regarding the political economy of the region, and highlights some of the most relevant factors, including regional economic shifts, national political and administrative reforms, the interdependence between regional and national politics, and the systematic use of violence. Available measures tend to confirm that local institutions are ranked among the worst in the nation, with particularly low scores in fiscal capacity, transparency, and electoral crimes. In spite of this, perceived corruption remains relatively low and some of these practices are more tolerated than in the rest of the country. This may reflect a greater degree of internalization of corrupt behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía & Iván Higuera-Mendieta, 2018. "Notas sobre la Economía Política del Caribe Colombiano," Documentos de trabajo sobre Economía Regional y Urbana 269, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:region:269
    DOI: 10.32468/dtseru.269
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economía política; Instituciones; Corrupción; Desarrollo Regional; Political Economy; Institutions; Corruption; Regional Development.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis

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