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Innovation and Growth under Private Information

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Abstract

We study endogenous growth within a model with occupational choice in which innovators produce ideas, within an asymmetric information framework. Each innovator has private knowledge of their production costs. Developers offer innovators non-linear contract schemes that affect both the number of innovators and the rate of economic growth. Two main results are obtained. First, the equilibrium contract under asymmetric information leads to the selection of highly-talented workers in R&D activities. Second, the growth rate is lower in the private information case when compared to the full-information benchmark due to the existence of an efficiency-rent extraction trade-off.

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  • Jose E. Gomez-Gonzalez & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2014. "Innovation and Growth under Private Information," Borradores de Economia 845, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:845
    DOI: 10.32468/be.845
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; Innovation; Endogenous growth.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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