IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bca/bocadp/15-16.html

Reputational Risk Management in Central Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Jill Vardy

Abstract

This paper discusses reputational risk in the context of central banking and explains why it matters to central banks. It begins with a general discussion of reputational risk within the broader framework of risk management. It then outlines how central banks define, measure, monitor and manage reputational risk, citing examples from central banks around the world, including the Bank of Canada. Finally, it presents a model for integrating reputational risk into policy analysis and operational planning—an “embedded communications” approach that ensures such considerations are brought into the core of central bank decision making.

Suggested Citation

  • Jill Vardy, 2015. "Reputational Risk Management in Central Banks," Discussion Papers 15-16, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocadp:15-16
    DOI: 10.34989/sdp-2015-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.34989/sdp-2015-16
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.oar-rao.bank-banque-canada.ca/record/6371/files/dp2015-16.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.34989/sdp-2015-16?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Helge Berger & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Monetary Policy in the Media," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(4), pages 689-709, June.
    2. Mike Hannah, 2015. "Being an engaging central bank," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 78, pages 1-83, May.
    3. Karyne B. Charbonneau & Lori Rennison, 2015. "Forward Guidance at the Effective Lower Bound: International Experience," Discussion Papers 15-15, Bank of Canada.
    4. Berger, Helge, 1997. "The Bundesbank's Path to Independence: Evidence from the 1950s," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 427-453, December.
    5. Andrew Filardo & Guonan Ma & Dubravko Mihaljek, 2011. "Exchange rate and monetary policy frameworks in EMEs," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Capital flows, commodity price movements and foreign exchange intervention, volume 57, pages 37-63, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsc, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
    7. Ping He & Guangyu Nie & Guanglong Wang & Xiang Zhang, 2011. "Optimal Monetary Policy in China," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 19(1), pages 83-105, January.
    8. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Politics and Monetary Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 941-960, August.
    9. Ianthi Vayid, 2013. "Central Bank Communications Before, During and After the Crisis: From Open-Market Operations to Open-Mouth Policy," Staff Working Papers 13-41, Bank of Canada.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Araujo, Luiz Nelson, 2016. "Dissemination of Information by the Federal Reserve System: An Overview and Benchmark," MPRA Paper 73185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Piotr Karaś & Krzysztof Kil, 2025. "Interest rate risk of central banks in Central and Eastern European countries and its impact on profitability and credibility in a turbulent socio-economic environment," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 56(3), pages 269-308.
    3. Sharon Kozicki & Jill Vardy, 2017. "Communicating Uncertainty in Monetary Policy," Discussion Papers 17-14, Bank of Canada.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Araujo, Luiz Nelson, 2016. "Dissemination of Information by the Federal Reserve System: An Overview and Benchmark," MPRA Paper 73185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    3. Klodiana Istrefi & Anamaria Piloiu, 2020. "Public Opinion on Central Banks when Economic Policy is Uncertain," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(2), pages 283-306.
    4. repec:ces:ifodic:v:10:y:2012:i:1:p:18175040 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-François & Persson, Eric, 2022. "Ideology and monetary policy. The role of political parties’ stances in the European Central Bank’s parliamentary hearings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    6. Harald Badinger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "National Representation in Multinational Institutions: The Case of the European Central Bank," CESifo Working Paper Series 3573, CESifo.
    7. Tim Munday & James Brookes, 2021. "Mark my words: the transmission of central bank communication to the general public via the print media," Bank of England working papers 944, Bank of England.
    8. Jorg Bibow, 2015. "The Euro's Savior? Assessing the ECB's Crisis Management Performance and Potential for Crisis Resolution," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_845, Levy Economics Institute.
    9. Hamza Bennani, 2023. "Overconfidence of the chair of the Federal Reserve and market expectations: Evidence based on media coverage," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 3403-3419, July.
    10. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    11. Jonas E. Arias & Guido Ascari & Nicola Branzoli & Efrem Castelnuovo, 2020. "Positive Trend Inflation and Determinacy in a Medium-Sized New Keynesian Model," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(3), pages 51-94, June.
    12. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2020. "Individual Competence and Committee Decision Making: Experimental Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1531-1558, April.
    13. van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B. & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W., 2010. "From actual to perceived transparency: The case of the European Central Bank," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 388-399, June.
    14. Tobback, Ellen & Nardelli, Stefano & Martens, David, 2017. "Between hawks and doves: measuring central bank communication," Working Paper Series 2085, European Central Bank.
    15. Picault, Matthieu & Pinter, Julien & Renault, Thomas, 2022. "Media sentiment on monetary policy: Determinants and relevance for inflation expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    16. Hayo, Bernd & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2015. "Self-monitoring or reliance on media reporting: How do financial market participants process central bank news?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 27-37.
    17. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Geoffrey Minne, 2014. "Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 107, pages 244-261, March.
    18. Lamla, Michael J. & Vinogradov, Dmitri V., 2019. "Central bank announcements: Big news for little people?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 21-38.
    19. Collignon, Stefan & Diessner, Sebastian, 2016. "The ECB's monetary dialogue with the European Parliament:efficiency and accountability during the Euro crisis?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67308, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    21. Paloviita, Maritta & Haavio, Markus & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Kilponen, Juha & Vänni, Ilona, 2020. "Reading between the lines : Using text analysis to estimate the loss function of the ECB," Research Discussion Papers 12/2020, Bank of Finland.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bca:bocadp:15-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bocgvca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.