The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government
In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank for the 1989 – 1998 period. We rely on a novel proxy for the impact of public communication by Bundesbank officials on the probability of conflict, in addition to interest rate, exchange rate, money supply behavior, as well as electoral influences. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that speeches by the Bundesbank President dealing with inflation and economic policy are a positive source of conflict in a probabilistic sense. Conflict was not a constant but flared up at times of economic stress and could be exacerbated by the "talking" of Bundesbank officials.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Grosse Scharrnstrasse 59, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder)|
Phone: +49 (0)335 5534 2387
Fax: +49 (0)335 5534 2516
Web page: http://www.wiwi.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/doktorandenausbildung/graduiertenkollegs/kapitalmaerkte/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000.
"Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(2), pages 218-35, May.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1997. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers : Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Discussion Paper 1997-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Brian P. Sack & Volker W. Wieland, 1999.
"Interest-rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: a review of recent empirical evidence,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
1999-39, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Sack, Brian & Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Interest-rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: a review of recent empirical evidence," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 205-228.
- Maier, Philipp & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2002. "Political pressure on the Bundesbank: an empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 103-123, March.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990.
"When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
593, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995. "When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and how much to talk: credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Working Papers 1990-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Siklos, Pierre L. & Skoczylas, Leslaw F., 2002. "Volatility clustering in real interest rates: international evidence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 193-209, June.
- Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
- Helge Berger & Marcel Thum, 2000. "News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 465-493, November.
- Artis, Michael J & Kontolemis, Zenon G & Osborn, Denise R, 1997. "Business Cycles for G7 and European Countries," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(2), pages 249-79, April.
- Johnson, David R & Siklos, Pierre L, 1996. "Political and Economic Determinants of Interest Rate Behavior: Are Central Banks Different?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 708-29, October.
- Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1981. "Central bank behavior : A positive empirical analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 291-315.
- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob, 1999. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948-1973)," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 17-39, February.
- Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:euvgra:20058. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.