The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government
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- Pierre L. Siklos & Martin T. Bohl, 2005. "The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 395-409, October.
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More about this item
KeywordsDeutsche Bundesbank; Conflict; Central Bank Communication; Political Factors;
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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