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Single-Name Credit Risk, Portfolio Risk, and Credit Rationing

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  • Arnold, Lutz G.
  • Reeder, Johannes
  • Trepl, Stefanie

Abstract

This paper introduces non-diversifiable risk in the Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection model, so that an increase in the average riskiness of the borrower pool causes higher portfolio risk. This opens up the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing. Comparative statics analysis shows that an increase in risk aversion turns a two-price equilibrium into a rationing equilibrium. A two-price equilibrium is more inefficient than a rationing equilibrium, and a usury law that rules out the higher of the two interest rates can be welfare-improving. Contrary to the common result, the equilibrium may be characterized by over-investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnold, Lutz G. & Reeder, Johannes & Trepl, Stefanie, 2010. "Single-Name Credit Risk, Portfolio Risk, and Credit Rationing," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 448, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bay:rdwiwi:17365
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    2. Lutz G. Arnold & John G. Riley, 2009. "On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2012-2021, December.
    3. Giuseppe Coco & David De Meza, 2009. "In Defense of Usury Laws," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(8), pages 1691-1703, December.
    4. Coco, G., 1997. "Credit Rationing and the Welfare Gain from Usury Laws," Discussion Papers 9715, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    5. David De Meza & David C. Webb, 2006. "Credit Rationing: Something's Gotta Give," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(292), pages 563-578, November.
    6. Coco, G., 1998. "On the Use of Collateral," Discussion Papers 9805, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    7. Lensink, Robert & Sterken, Elmer, 2002. "The Option to Wait to Invest and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(1), pages 221-225, February.
    8. Machin, Stephen & Van Reenen, John, 1993. "Profit Margins and the Business Cycle: Evidence from UK Manufacturing Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 29-50, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof & Douglas Laxton, 2014. "Financial Crises in DSGE Models; A Prototype Model," IMF Working Papers 2014/057, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Clancy, Daragh & Merola, Rossana, 2014. "The effect of macroprudential policy on endogenous credit cycles," Research Technical Papers 15/RT/14, Central Bank of Ireland.
    3. Clancy, Daragh & Merola, Rossana, 2017. "Countercyclical capital rules for small open economies," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 332-351.
    4. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka, 2018. "Collateral in credit rationing in markets with asymmetric information," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 97-102.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; credit rationing;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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