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A Re-examination of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss Model


  • Su, Xunhua

    () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)


With a more general setting, we illustrate that credit rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model is sensitive to the ranking of projects. Given that the ranking is according to the mean-preserving-spread, adverse selection and moral hazard cannot co-exist and credit rationing occurs only under extreme conditions. Even if a more general ranking according to the second-order-stochastic-dominance allows for the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard, credit rationing implies a take-it-or-leave-it choice for both contract parties and requires that borrowers' collateral amounts are positively correlated with their risk. We argue that these required conditions leave little room for the signicance of credit rationing.

Suggested Citation

  • Su, Xunhua, 2010. "A Re-examination of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss Model," Discussion Papers 2010/14, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, revised 31 Dec 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2010_014

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
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    More about this item


    Credit rationing; credit market; Stiglitz and Weiss; collateral;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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