Inequality of Opportunity in the Credit Market
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Giuseppe Coco & Giuseppe Pignataro, 2013. "Unfair credit allocations," Small Business Economics, Springer, pages 241-251.
- G. Coco & G. Pignataro, 2012. "Wealth inequality, unequal opportunities and inefficient credit market," Working Papers wp851, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Estache, Antonio & Goicoechea, Ana & Trujillo, Lourdes, 2009.
"Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries,"
Elsevier, pages 191-202.
- Estache, Antonio & Goicoechea, Ana & Trujillo, Lourdes, 2006. "Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4081, The World Bank.
- Coco, G. & Pignataro, G., 2011. "Perverse cross-subsidization in the credit market," Working Papers 11/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Antonio Estache & A. Goicoechea & Lourdes Trujillo, 2008. "Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43908, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
More about this item
Keywordsequality of opportunity; credit; moral hazard; crosssubsidization; collateral;
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
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