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Credit Market Failures and Policy


  • Enrico Minelli
  • Salvatore Modica


In a simplified version of the Stiglitz–Weiss (1981) model of the credit market we characterize optimal policies to correct market failures. Widely applied policies, notably interest–rate subsidies and investment subsidies, are compared to the theoretical optimum. Some comments on the trade-off between credit subsidy and infrastructural investment are added in the conclusions.

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  • Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica, 2006. "Credit Market Failures and Policy," Working Papers ubs0607, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0607

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    Cited by:

    1. Ono, Arito & Uesugi, Iichiro & Yasuda, Yukihiro, 2013. "Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 151-167.
    2. Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2012. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 1-28, February.
    3. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
    4. Jean Tirole, 2012. "Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 29-59, February.
    5. Martin Meier & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2014. "Competitive markets with private information on both sides," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 257-280, February.
    6. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Rationing and Public Support of Commercial Credit," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp436, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Rosella Levaggi & Francesco Menoncin, 2009. "Decentralized provision of merit and impure public goods," Working Papers 0909, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    8. Bisin, A. & Geanakoplos, J.D. & Gottardi, P. & Minelli, E. & Polemarchakis, H., 2011. "Markets and contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 279-288.
    9. Francesco Menoncin & Paolo Panteghini, 2009. "Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation in the Real World," CESifo Working Paper Series 2674, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power," Working Papers IES 2011/18, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2011.
    11. Del Boca, Alessandra & Fratianni, Michele & Spinelli, Franco & Trecroci, Carmine, 2010. "The Phillips curve and the Italian lira, 1861-1998," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 182-197, August.
    12. Alessandro Fedele & Paolo M. Panteghini & Sergio Vergalli, 2011. "Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax‐Rate Uncertainty," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(4), pages 438-468, November.
    13. Amedeo Fossati & Rosella Levaggi, 2008. "Delay is not the answer: waiting time in health care & income redistribution," Working Papers 0801, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    14. Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci, 2010. "Do Social Enterprises Finance Their Investments Differently from For-profit Firms? The Case of Social Residential Services in Italy," Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 174-189, October.
    15. Francesco Cohen & Alessandro Fedele & Paolo M. Panteghini, 2016. "Corporate taxation and financial strategies under asymmetric information," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 33(1), pages 9-34, April.
    16. Alessandro Fedele & Francesco Liucci & Andrea Mantovani, 2009. "Credit availability in the crisis: the European investment bank group," Working Papers 0913, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    17. Jimmy Melo, 2014. "Expectativas cambiarias, selección adversa y liquidez," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(1), pages 27-62, May.
    18. Hyonok KIM & YASUDA Yukihiro, 2015. "Accounting Information Quality and Government Guaranteed Loans: Evidence from Japanese SMEs," Discussion papers 15138, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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