A marketing-finance approach linking contracts in agricultural channels to shareholder value
A conceptual marketing-finance framework is proposed which links channel contracting in agriculture and the use of financial facilitating services (e.g., financial derivatives) to (shareholder) value creation. The framework complements existing literature by explicitly including channel contract relationships as market-based assets that can be managed to reduce cash flow volatility and hence increase shareholder value. We show how financial facilitating services (e.g., derivatives) can be used to complement the cash flows components of channel contract relationships thereby further reducing the risk adjusted cost of capital and improving shareholder value. In a field study of producers, wholesalers, and processors, in the potato and meat industry the framework shows how shareholder value can be enhanced by using financial facilitating services, such as derivatives, to complement marketing channel relationships. Moreover, this study shows how producers and managers from agribusiness companies can use such financial services as conflict-solving tools in case of incongruent contract preferences between channel members.
|Date of creation:||02 Sep 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.eaae.org|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joost M. E. Pennings, 2004. "Channel Contract Behavior: The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, And Channel Members' Market Structures," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(4), pages 697-724, October.
- Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993.
" Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-1658, December.
- Kenneth A. Froot & David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1992. "Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," NBER Working Papers 4084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987. "On Optimal Competitive Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(11), pages 1481-1488, November.
- Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 1998. "Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 99-129, 02.
- Leland, Hayne E, 1994. " Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1213-1252, September.
- Hayne E. Leland., 1994. "Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-233, University of California at Berkeley.
- Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2005. "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 3-73, December.
- John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, 2004. "The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 10550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joost M.E. Pennings & Ale Smidts, 2000. "Assessing the Construct Validity of Risk Attitude," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(10), pages 1337-1348, October.
- Pennings, Joost M. E. & M. Leuthold, Raymond, 2001. "Introducing new futures contracts: reinforcement versus cannibalism," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 659-675, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:eaae11:114785. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.