Adapting Contract Theory to Fit Contract Farming
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.161894
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Keywords
Agricultural and Food Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AGR-2014-01-17 (Agricultural Economics)
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