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Can the European Green Deal be a game changer for sustainable food system transformation? A computational political economy approach

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  • Panknin, Lea
  • Boy, Karl-Friedrich
  • Henning, Christian H.C.A.

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  • Panknin, Lea & Boy, Karl-Friedrich & Henning, Christian H.C.A., 2024. "Can the European Green Deal be a game changer for sustainable food system transformation? A computational political economy approach," 2024 Annual Meeting, July 28-30, New Orleans, LA 343740, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea24:343740
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.343740
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Beckman, Jayson & Ivanic, Maros & Jelliffe, Jeremy L. & Baquedano, Felix G. & Scott, Sara G., 2020. "Economic and Food Security Impacts of Agricultural Input Reduction Under the European Union Green Deal’s Farm to Fork and Biodiversity Strategies," Agricultural Economic Reports 307277, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    2. Kleijnen, Jack P. C. & Sargent, Robert G., 2000. "A methodology for fitting and validating metamodels in simulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 14-29, January.
    3. Ruben, Ruerd & van Ruijven, Arjan, 2001. "Technical coefficients for bio-economic farm household models: a meta-modelling approach with applications for Southern Mali," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 427-441, March.
    4. Nelson B Villoria & Paul V Preckel, 2017. "Gaussian Quadratures vs. Monte Carlo Experiments for Systematic Sensitivity Analysis of Computable General Equilibrium Model Results," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 480-487.
    5. Mark S. Handcock & Adrian E. Raftery & Jeremy M. Tantrum, 2007. "Model‐based clustering for social networks," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 170(2), pages 301-354, March.
    6. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    7. Gersbach, Hans & Beilharz, Hans-Jörg, 2004. "General Equilibrium Effects and Voting into a Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 4454, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 73-88, March.
    9. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
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