IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/ple601.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Dan Levin

Personal Details

First Name:Dan
Middle Name:
Last Name:Levin
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ple601
http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/levin/
The Ohio State University 443B Arps Hall 1945 North High Street Columbus, Ohio 43210-1172
614-688-4239
Terminal Degree:1982 Economics Department; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Ohio State University

Columbus, Ohio (United States)
http://economics.osu.edu/
RePEc:edi:deohsus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Dan Levin & James Peck & Asen Ivanov, 2015. "Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 776, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  2. Reiss, J. Philipp & Levin, Dan, 2013. "Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79926, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Gary Charness & Edi Karni & Dan Levin, 2012. "Ambiguity Attitudes and Social Interactions: An Experimental Investigation," Economics Working Paper Archive 590, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  4. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2010. "Behavioral Biases, Informational Externalities, and Efficiency in Endogenous-Timing Herding Games: an Experimental Study," Working Papers 1004, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2008. "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values," Working Papers 0801, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
  6. Charness, Gary B & Levin, Dan & Karni, Edi, 2008. "On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2dn4t727, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  7. Charness, Gary B & Levin, Dan, 2007. "The Origin of the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8g88c6ww, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  8. Dan Levin & James Peck, 2005. "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000607, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2003. "Bayesian Updating vs. Reinforcement and Affect: A Laboratory Study," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000180, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Charness, Gary & Levin, Dan, 2003. "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt7g63k28w, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  11. Levin, D., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: The 50 Percent Bench-Mark," Papers 19, Houston - Department of Economics.
  12. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D. & Harstad, R.M., 1988. "Judgment, Evaluation And Information Processing In Second- Price Common Value Auctions," Papers 14, Houston - Department of Economics.
  13. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
  14. Dyer, D. & Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "A Comparison Of Naive And Experienced Bidders In Common Value Offer Auctions A Laboratory Analysis," Papers 11, Houston - Department of Economics.
  15. Eldor, Rafael & Levin, Dan, 1986. "Trade Liberalization and Imperfect Competition: A Welfare Analysis," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275418, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
  16. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, "undated". "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0803, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.

    repec:qmw:qmwecw:wp776 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Yaron Azrieli & Dan Levin, 2020. "Stable unions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(2), pages 337-365, March.
  2. Charness, Gary & Levin, Dan & Schmeidler, David, 2019. "An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 73-98.
  3. McGee, Peter & Levin, Dan, 2019. "How obvious is the dominant strategy in an English Auction? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 355-365.
  4. Cobo-Reyes, Ramón & Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Levin, Dan, 2017. "The effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal-agent relationships with team production," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 324-338.
  5. Sotiris Georganas & Dan Levin & Peter McGee, 2017. "Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 772-792, December.
  6. Luyao Zhang & Dan Levin, 2017. "Bounded Rationality and Robust Mechanism Design: An Axiomatic Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 235-239, May.
  7. Jaromír Kovářík & Dan Levin & Tao Wang, 2016. "Ellsberg paradox: Ambiguity and complexity aversions compared," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 47-64, February.
  8. Dan Levin & James Peck & Asen Ivanov, 2016. "Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 39-60, May.
  9. Gary Charness & Edi Karni & Dan Levin, 2013. "Ambiguity attitudes and social interactions: An experimental investigation," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-25, February.
  10. Xu, Xiaoshu & Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin, 2013. "Auctions with entry and resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 92-105.
  11. Ivanov, Asen & Levin, Dan & Peck, James, 2013. "Behavioral biases in endogenous-timing herding games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 25-34.
  12. Xiaoshu Xu & Dan Levin & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Auctions with synergy and resale," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 397-426, May.
  13. Azrieli Yaron & Levin Dan, 2012. "Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, May.
  14. Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan, 2012. "Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 611-635.
  15. Hoffman, Ross M. & Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 2011. "Simultaneous versus sequential information processing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 16-18, July.
  16. Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan, 2011. "Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 301-309.
  17. Charness, Gary & Karni, Edi & Levin, Dan, 2010. "On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 551-556, March.
  18. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, 2010. "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1435-1452, July.
  19. Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2009. "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 207-236, February.
  20. Dan Levin & James Peck & Lixin Ye, 2009. "Quality Disclosure And Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 167-196, March.
  21. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2009. "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1484-1507, September.
  22. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 2009. "Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 221-237, May.
  23. Levin, Dan & Peck, James, 2008. "Investment dynamics with common and private values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 114-139, November.
  24. Rose, Susan L. & Levin, Dan, 2008. "An experimental investigation of the explosive effect in almost common value auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 927-946, September.
  25. Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin, 2008. "Hybrid auctions revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 591-594, June.
  26. Gary Charness & Edi Karni & Dan Levin, 2007. "Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 129-148, October.
  27. Levin, Dan & Peck, James & Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Bad news can be good news: Early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 462-467, June.
  28. Colin Campbell & Dan Levin, 2006. "When and why not to auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 583-596, April.
  29. Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H., 2005. "Almost common values auctions revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1125-1136, July.
  30. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 2005. "Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 170-207, November.
  31. Dan Levin, 2005. "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 467-471, March.
  32. Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2005. "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1300-1309, September.
  33. Levin, Dan & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2004. "Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 229-251, October.
  34. Dan Levin, 2004. "The Competitiveness of Joint Bidding in Multiple-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 373-385, Summer.
  35. Levin, Dan & Peck, James, 2003. "To Grab for the Market or to Bide One's Time: A Dynamic Model of Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 536-556, Autumn.
  36. Dan Levin & James L. Smith, 2002. "Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 321-350.
  37. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 2001. "Behavior in Multi-unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 413-454, March.
  38. Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000. "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 106-120, March.
  39. John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1999. "Common Value Auctions with Insider Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1219-1238, September.
  40. Smith, James L. & Levin, Dan, 1996. "Ranking Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 549-561, February.
  41. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1996. "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1271-1283, September.
  42. Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 442-460, June.
  43. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan & Harstad, Ronald M, 1995. "Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(3), pages 293-319.
  44. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
  45. Karni, Edi & Levin, Dan, 1994. "Social Attributes and Strategic Equilibrium: A Restaurant Pricing Game," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 822-840, August.
  46. Yun Joo Jung & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1994. "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 72-93, Spring.
  47. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1993. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 868-879, July.
  48. Baltagi, Badi H. & Levin, Dan, 1992. "Cigarette taxation: Raising revenues and reducing consumption," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 321-335, December.
  49. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1991. "Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 370-375, March.
  50. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1991. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 362-369, March.
  51. Harstad, Ronald M. & Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1990. "Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-40, May.
  52. Levin, Dan, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: The 50-Percent Benchmark," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1238-1245, December.
  53. Eldor, Rafael & Levin, Dan, 1990. "Trade Liberalization and Domestic Monopoly: A Welfare Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(4), pages 773-782, November.
  54. Kagel, John H, et al, 1989. "First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse."," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 241-258, April.
  55. Dyer, Douglas & Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1989. "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 108-115, March.
  56. Douglas Dyer & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1989. "Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 268-279, Summer.
  57. Levin, Dan, 1988. "Stackelberg, Cournot and Collusive Monopoly: Performance and Welfare Comparisons," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 317-330, April.
  58. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
  59. Baltagi, Badi H & Levin, Dan, 1986. "Estimating Dynamic Demand for Cigarettes Using Panel Data: The Effects of Bootlegging, Taxation and Advertising Reconsidered," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(1), pages 148-155, February.
  60. Levin, Dan & Harstad, Ronald M., 1986. "Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 315-319.
  61. Levin, Dan, 1986. "On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(2-3), pages 165-167.
  62. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
  63. Ronald M. Harstad & Dan Levin, 1985. "A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 525-528.
  64. Levin, Dan, 1985. "Taxation within Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 281-290, August.
  65. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1985. "Individual bidder behavior in first-price private value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 125-128.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  20. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  21. Number of Journal Pages
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  27. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  28. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  29. Euclidian citation score
  30. Breadth of citations across fields
  31. Wu-Index

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (6) 2005-03-20 2008-09-20 2008-09-20 2010-12-18 2014-02-02 2015-12-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2005-03-20 2005-03-20 2010-12-18
  3. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2003-08-24

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Dan Levin should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.