Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?
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- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert B. Wilson, 1967. "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(11), pages 816-820, July.
- Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982.
"The value of information in a sealed-bid auction,"
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Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
- M. Weverbergh, 1979. "Note--Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 291-294, March.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994.
"Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-44, November.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H. & Wilson, Charles A., 1990. "Auctions For Oil And Gas Leases With An Informed Bidder And A Random Reservation Price," Working Papers 90-47, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1999. "Common Value Auctions with Insider Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1219-1238, September.
- Laskowski, Michael C. & Slonim, Robert L., 1999. "An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-255, August.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
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