Note--Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
This note reanalyzes the following problem, formerly treated by Wilson (Wilson, R. B. 1967. Competitive bidding with asymmetric information. Management Sci. 13 (July) 816-820): two parties have to submit bids for an object One of them knows the value with certainty, the other does not. The equilibrium derived differs from Wilson's solution and yields a simple explanation for the case cited by Wilson: the value of the game is essentially zero for the party with incomplete information.
Volume (Year): 25 (1979)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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