Auctions with an inexpert bidder
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- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994.
"Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-1444, November.
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- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Nonnenmacher, Tomas, 1999. "A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 232-245, July.
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- Piccione, Michele & Tan, Guofu, 1996. "A Simple Model of Expert and Non-Expert Bidding in First-Price Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 501-515, August.
- Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000. "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 106-120, March.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)