Stackelberg, Cournot and Collusive Monopoly: Performance and Welfare Comparisons
This article compares and evaluates performance and welfare in three classical oligopoly models: Stackel berg leader, Cournot, and collusive monopoly. Hahn's stability condit ions render an unambiguous ranking of market price; the monopoly pric e is highest and the Stackelberg price is lowest. Welfare comparisons are less clear-cut due to additional effects coming from reallocatio n of outputs among sellers. Conditions under which these reallocation effects will enhance or offset the unambiguous price effects on welf are are discussed and examples are given. Possible implications for a ntitrust policy, regarding constraints on market share of large produ cers in noncompetitive markets, are examined. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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