Un modelo de equilibrio general con externalidades y capital natural
This book discusses a model of general equilibrium with a sector generating externalities on another sector with clean production, consumers and nature (natural capital). The scope of efficiency of mitigation policy instruments are analysed simultaneously with the activities of production and consumption, in the cases of: nature as a free good, nature as a private good, assignment of market efficiency and general equilibrium, payment of taxes or tradable permits and the use of pollution mitigation technologies. Our model predicts that: the polluting sector ends in a worse situation in the equilibrium with externalities; inside there will be firms benefiting or resulting most disadvantaged with pollution, whereby incentives to acquire mitigation technologies are not homogeneous —such incentives are higher when taxes should be paid—. However, distributive and welfare effects vary depending on the policy instrument, being higher when pollution permits are allowed among the affected.
|This book is provided by Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía in its series Libros del Grupo Microeconomía Aplicada with number 01 and published in 2011.|
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