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Promotion incentives and water pollution control in the context of environment tournaments: Evidence on the age of officials from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design

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  • Jiankun Yang
  • Xiaochen Gong

Abstract

China has suffered from severe water quality degradation over the past decades. In view of officials' promotion tournaments in China, this study employs a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to empirically examine the impact of promotion incentives, which is influenced by officials' individual characteristics, on water governance. Results indicate that younger mayors, especially those below the age of 53 and with higher promotion prospects, are more proactive in enforcing water pollution control measures. Further analysis indicates that officials reduce water pollution emissions primarily by implementing environmental incentives and adopting strategic measures according to geographical location and the nature of pollutants.

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  • Jiankun Yang & Xiaochen Gong, 2024. "Promotion incentives and water pollution control in the context of environment tournaments: Evidence on the age of officials from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(4), pages 2548-2565, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:4:p:2548-2565
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.4145
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