IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v27y2006i2-3p173-187.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Explaining clustering in social networks: towards an evolutionary theory of cascading benefits

Author

Listed:
  • Sheen S. Levine

    (Management Department, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899, Singapore)

  • Robert Kurzban

    (Department of Psychology, 3720 Walnut Street, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

Abstract

Individual and organizational actors enter into a large number of relationships that include benefiting others without ensuring the equality of reciprocal benefits. We suggest that actors have evolved mechanisms that guide them in the choice of exchange partners, even without conscious calculation or bookkeeping of gain and loss. One such mechanism directs actors to membership in clusters, which are homogenous groups of actors densely connected among themselves and only loosely connected to other groups. We suggest that clusters offer network externalities, which are not possible in sparse networks, thus conferring cascading benefits on the actors contained in those clusters. Using this logic, one can understand the omnipresence of clustering in social networks of individuals and firms. We review the benefits and challenges associated with clustering and use the logic of cascading benefits to derive empirical predictions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheen S. Levine & Robert Kurzban, 2006. "Explaining clustering in social networks: towards an evolutionary theory of cascading benefits," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2-3), pages 173-187.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:173-187
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1291
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1291
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/mde.1291?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    2. Gordon Walker & Bruce Kogut & Weijian Shan, 1997. "Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 109-125, April.
    3. Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd, 2004. "Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem," Nature, Nature, vol. 432(7016), pages 499-502, November.
    4. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
    5. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    6. Sidney G. Winter & Gabriel Szulanski, 2001. "Replication as Strategy," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(6), pages 730-743, December.
    7. Michael Prietula & Kathleen Carley & Les Gasser (ed.), 1998. "Simulating Organizations: Computational Models of Institutions and Groups," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026266108x, December.
    8. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-440, June.
    9. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
    10. Olav Sorenson & Jan W. Rivkin & Lee Fleming, 2010. "Complexity, Networks and Knowledge Flows," Chapters, in: Ron Boschma & Ron Martin (ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Economic Geography, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Martin J. Conyon & Mark R. Muldoon, 2006. "The Small World of Corporate Boards," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9-10), pages 1321-1343.
    12. Levinthal, Daniel & March, James G., 1981. "A model of adaptive organizational search," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 307-333, December.
    13. Wilson, James Q., 1993. "The Moral Sense," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 1-11, March.
    14. Joel A. C. Baum & Andrew V. Shipilov & Tim J. Rowley, 2003. "Where do small worlds come from?," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(4), pages 697-725, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tadao Hoshino & Daichi Shimamoto & Yasuyuki Todo, 2020. "Accounting for Heterogeneity in Network Formation Behaviour: An Application to Vietnamese SMEs," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 82(5), pages 1042-1067, October.
    2. Timm Teubner & Sonia Camacho, 2023. "Facing Reciprocity: How Photos and Avatars Promote Interaction in Micro-communities," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 435-467, April.
    3. Engel, Yuval & Kaandorp, Mariëtte & Elfring, Tom, 2017. "Toward a dynamic process model of entrepreneurial networking under uncertainty," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 35-51.
    4. Ebbes, Peter & Huang, Zan & Rangaswamy, Arvind, 2016. "Sampling designs for recovering local and global characteristics of social networks," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 578-599.
    5. Sheen S. Levine & Michael J. Prietula, 2012. "How Knowledge Transfer Impacts Performance: A Multilevel Model of Benefits and Liabilities," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(6), pages 1748-1766, December.
    6. Hassan M K Ghomrawi & Russell J Funk & Michael L Parks & Jason Owen-Smith & John M Hollingsworth, 2018. "Physician referral patterns and racial disparities in total hip replacement: A network analysis approach," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(2), pages 1-10, February.
    7. Stienmetz, Jason L. & Fesenmaier, Daniel R., 2015. "Estimating value in Baltimore, Maryland: An attractions network analysis," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 238-252.
    8. Côme Billard, 2020. "Technology Contagion in Networks," Working Papers 2020.01, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    9. Jesse Shore & Ethan Bernstein & David Lazer, 2015. "Facts and Figuring: An Experimental Investigation of Network Structure and Performance in Information and Solution Spaces," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 1432-1446, October.
    10. Sheen S. Levine & Michael J. Prietula & Ann Majchrzak, 2022. "Advice in Crisis: Principles of Organizational and Entrepreneurial Resilience," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 11(4), pages 145-168, December.
    11. Sanghita Basu & Mousumi Roy & Parimal Pal, 2019. "Corporate greening in a large developing economy: pollution prevention strategies," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 1603-1633, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Rajat Khanna & Isin Guler, 2022. "Degree assortativity in collaboration networks and invention performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(7), pages 1402-1430, July.
    3. Uwe Cantner & Holger Graf, 2011. "Innovation Networks: Formation, Performance and Dynamics," Chapters, in: Cristiano Antonelli (ed.), Handbook on the Economic Complexity of Technological Change, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Fehr, Ernst & Henrich, Joseph, 2003. "Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism," IZA Discussion Papers 712, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Tobias Hahn & Noël Albert, 2017. "Strong Reciprocity in Consumer Boycotts," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 509-524, October.
    6. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 66, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Mahmud, Minhaj & Martinsson, Peter, 2005. "Does stake size matter in trust games?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 365-369, September.
    8. Schilling, Melissa A. & Green, Elad, 2011. "Recombinant search and breakthrough idea generation: An analysis of high impact papers in the social sciences," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1321-1331.
    9. James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2018. "Incentives," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2018-01, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    10. Kudic, Muhamed & Pyka, Andreas & Günther, Jutta, 2012. "Determinants of Evolutionary Change Processes in Innovation Networks – Empirical Evidence from the German Laser Industry," IWH Discussion Papers 7/2012, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    11. Steffen Andersen & Seda Ertac & Uri Gneezy & Moshe Hoffman & John A. List, 2011. "Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3427-3439, December.
    12. Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2012. "Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 17-34.
    13. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Kuhn, Michael A., 2013. "Experimental methods: Extra-laboratory experiments-extending the reach of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 93-100.
    14. Engström, Per & Forsell, Eskil, 2018. "Demand effects of consumers’ stated and revealed preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 43-61.
    15. Christian Korth, 2009. "Reciprocity—An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Fairness in Bargaining and Markets, chapter 0, pages 35-55, Springer.
    16. Simon G�chter & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Fairness in the Labour Market � A Survey of Experimental Results," IEW - Working Papers 114, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Tobias Buchman & Andreas Pyka, 2012. "Innovation Networks," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 33, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers 075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    19. Naef, Michael & Schupp, Jürgen, 2009. "Measuring Trust: Experiments and Surveys in Contrast and Combination," IZA Discussion Papers 4087, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2003. "Why labour market experiments?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 399-406, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:173-187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.