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The resource-based tangle: towards a sustainable explanation of competitive advantage

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolai J. Foss

    (Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjergvej 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark)

  • Thorbjørn Knudsen

    (Department of Marketing, University of Southern Denmark|Odense University, Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark)

Abstract

To advance the RBV we propose separation of necessary and additional conditions for the expression of SCA. We argue that there are only two necessary conditions, namely uncertainty and immobility and that all other conditions are additional. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolai J. Foss & Thorbjørn Knudsen, 2003. "The resource-based tangle: towards a sustainable explanation of competitive advantage," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(4), pages 291-307.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:291-307
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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