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Creating, Capturing and Protecting Value A Property Rights-based View of CompetitiveStrategy

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  • Kirsten Foss
  • Nicolai J. Foss

Abstract

This paper develops a property rights-based view of strategy (the “PRV”). A property right (or economic right) is an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of an asset (including, e.g., a monopoly position) or consume it indirectly through exchange. Resources expended on exchanging, protecting and capturing such rights are transaction costs; thus, we directly link property rights, transaction costs, and economic value. We assume that all relevant exchange is costly and that all agents maximize their property rights. This implies that economizing with transaction costs may be a distinct source of value, and potentially of sustained competitive advantage. Moreover, strategizing may be understood as revolving around influencing impediments (i.e., transaction costs) to value creation. Expectations and contracting also become crucial parts of processes of creating, protecting and capturing value. We use these insights to derive a number of refutable propositions, and argue that key insights from both industrial organization economics and the resource-based view are consistent with the PRV.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 2002. "Creating, Capturing and Protecting Value A Property Rights-based View of CompetitiveStrategy," DRUID Working Papers 02-02, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:aal:abbswp:02-02
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolai J. Foss, 2002. "The Strategy and Transaction Cost Nexus Past Debates, Central Questions, and Future Research Possibilities," DRUID Working Papers 02-04, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    2. repec:dgr:rugsom:02b62 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Philipp N. Baecker, 2007. "Real Options and Intellectual Property," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, number 978-3-540-48264-2, October.
    4. Mol, Joeri M. & Wijnberg, Nachoem M., 2002. "Value chain envy: explaining new entry and vertical integration in popular music," Research Report 02B62, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; transaction costs; industrial organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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