Strategic factor markets: Bargaining, scarcity, and resource complementarity
Strategic factor market theory suggests that without luck or asymmetric expectations, firms can't appropriate gains from acquired resources. Adopting the bargaining perspective on resource advantage, we hold that this is only true in the absence of resource complementarity. We extend factor market theory to account for resource complementarity, and we show that firms can profit when they exhibit superior complementarity to target resources, even in the absence of asymmetric expectations. Thus we provide an alternative interpretation of managers' recent emphasis on externally acquired resources.
|Date of creation:||18 Jan 2007|
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