The Response of Worker Effort to Piece Rates: Evidence from the Midwest Logging Industry
Using firm-level payroll data from the Midwest logging industry, I compute a worker’s productivity response to a change in piece-rate pay, an elasticity of effort, using an empirical specification developed in Paarsch and Shearer (1999). Maximum-likelihood estimation of an agency-based structural econometric model of worker choice yields elasticities ranging from 0.413 to 1.507. These estimates are smaller than, but qualitatively similar to, those reported in Paarsch and Shearer, suggesting that their model has perhaps more general applicability than their British Columbia tree-planting example.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 1999. "The Response of Worker Effort to Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(4), pages 643-667.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:38:y:2003:i:4:p881-890. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.