Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-17, CIRANO.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2009.
"Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: Evidence from production contracts data,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 489-500, July.
- Dubois, P. & Vukina, T., 2005. "Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200511, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25568, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2008. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," IDEI Working Papers 393, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2005. "Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24645, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
More about this item
Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Manuel Paradis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/delvlca.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lvl/laeccr/0401.html