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Perceptions to climatic changes and cooperative attitudes toward flood protection in Bangladesh

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Abstract

Subjective performance evaluation serves as a double-edged sword. While it can mitigate multitasking agency problems, it also opens the door to evaluators' biases, resulting in lower job satisfaction and a higher rate of worker quits. Using the personnel records of individual sales representatives in a major car sales company in Japan, we provide direct evidence for both sides of subjective performance evaluation: (1) the sensitivity of evaluations to sales performance declines with the marginal productivity of hard-to-measure tasks, and (2) measures of potential evaluation bias we construct are positively associated with worker quits, after correcting for possible endogeneity biases.

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  • Shingo Takahashi & Hideo Owan & Tsuyoshi Tsuru & Katsuhito Uehara, 2014. "Perceptions to climatic changes and cooperative attitudes toward flood protection in Bangladesh," Working Papers EMS_2014_11, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
    • Handle: RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2014_11
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices

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