IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v38y1995i1p207-24.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?

Author

Listed:
  • Png, I P L
  • Reitman, David

Abstract

Why do some consumers pay a premium for branded products? According to the consumer information theory, brands signal the quality of experience goods (products whose quality cannot be determined on inspection) to consumers for whom personal search and testing is relatively costly. We find that the product and customer mix in a sample of branded and unbranded service stations is generally consistent with the theory. Branded dealers are more likely to carry products for which cheating on quality is an issue and to serve customers for whom personal search and testing is relatively costly. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Png, I P L & Reitman, David, 1995. "Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 207-224, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:1:p:207-24
    DOI: 10.1086/467329
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467329
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/467329?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harianto & Quilkey, John J., 1991. "Retail Pricing in Jakarta - An Exploration," 1991 Conference (35th), February 11-14, 1991, Armidale, Australia 145895, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Shepard, Andrea, 1991. "Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 30-53, February.
    3. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    4. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
    5. anonymous, 1991. "Small business: retail employment," Cross Sections, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 8(Spr), pages 1-16.
    6. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1987. "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 265-309, October.
    7. Asher Wolinsky, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 647-658.
    8. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    9. Michael H. Riordan, 1986. "Monopolistic Competition with Experience Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 265-279.
    10. Julia Liebeskind & Richard P. Rumelt, 1989. "Markets for Experience Goods with Performance Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 601-621, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul H. Jensen & Elizabeth Webster, 2006. "Market Power, Brand Characteristics and Demand for Retail Grocery Products," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2006n05, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    2. Juergen Noll, 2003. "Does One Size Fit All? A Note on the Harmonization of National Warranty Law as a Tool of Consumer Protection," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 219-231, September.
    3. Roger Bate & Ginger Zhe Jin & Aparna Mathur, 2012. "Counterfeit or Substandard? Assessing Price and Non-Price Signals of Drug Quality," NBER Working Papers 18073, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. González-Benito, Óscar & Martos-Partal, Mercedes & San Martín, Sonia, 2015. "Brands as substitutes for the need for touch in online shopping," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 121-125.
    5. Alessandro Stanziani, 2004. "Wine Reputation and Quality Controls: The Origin of the AOCs in 19th Century France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 149-167, September.
    6. Borghesani, William H. & de la Cruz, Peter L. & Berry, David B., 1997. "Controlling the chain: buyer power, distributive control, and new dynamics in retailing," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 17-24.
    7. Ganesh Iyer & P.B. Seetharaman, 2003. "To Price Discriminate or Not: Product Choice and the Selection Bias Problem," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 155-178, June.
    8. Chu, Junhong & Arce-Urriza, Marta & Cebollada-Calvo, José-Javier & Chintagunta, Pradeep K., 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of Shopping Behavior Across Online and Offline Channels for Grocery Products: The Moderating Effects of Household and Product Characteristics," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 251-268.
    9. Anderson, Kelley Cours & Laverie, Debra A., 2022. "In the consumers’ eye: A mixed-method approach to understanding how VR-Content influences unbranded product quality perceptions," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    10. Emek Basker & Lucia Foster & Shawn Klimek, 2017. "Customer‐employee substitution: Evidence from gasoline stations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 876-896, December.
    11. Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, 2012. "How Does the Use of Trademarks by Third-Party Sellers Affect Online Search?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 819-837, September.
    12. Duke, Richard D. & Jacobson, Arne & Kammen, Daniel M., 2002. "Photovoltaic module quality in the Kenyan solar home systems market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 477-499, May.
    13. Dutton, Jennifer M. & Ward, Clement E. & Lusk, Jayson L., 2007. "Implicit Value of Retail Beef Brands and Retail Meat Product Attributes," 2007 Conference, April 16-17, 2007, Chicago, Illinois 37571, NCCC-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management.
    14. Giovanni B. Ramello, 2006. "What'S In A Sign ? Trademark Law And Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 547-565, September.
    15. Zenger, Hans, 2012. "The marginal price effects of antitrust rules against price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 921-923.
    16. Juan Delgado & Michael Waterson, 2003. "Tyre price dispersion across retail outlets in the UK," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 491-509, December.
    17. Régibeau, P & Rockett, K, 2004. "The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach," Economics Discussion Papers 2851, University of Essex, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li, Jianpei & Zhang, Wanzhu, 2022. "Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality," MPRA Paper 120263, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Jan 2023.
    2. Cagé, Julia & Rouzet, Dorothée, 2015. "Improving “national brands”: Reputation for quality and export promotion strategies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 274-290.
    3. Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis, 2000. "Quality uncertainty and informative advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 615-640, May.
    4. Krahmer, Daniel, 2003. "Entry and experimentation in oligopolistic markets for experience goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1201-1213, October.
    5. Navarro, Noemí, 2012. "Price and quality decisions under network effects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 263-270.
    6. Yongmin Chen, 2024. "Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 633-661, June.
    7. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 2000. "Competing with Experience Goods," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0771, Econometric Society.
    8. Julio César Arteaga & Daniel Flores, 2022. "Price Regulation and Fraud—with Special Emphasis on Gasoline Retailing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 175-192, March.
    9. Baojun Jiang & Bicheng Yang, 2019. "Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 272-285, January.
    10. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "The Economics of Geographical Indications: GIs Modelled As Club Assets," IHEID Working Papers 10-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    11. Krähmer, Daniel, 2002. "Entry and experimentation in oligopolistic markets for experience goods [Markteintritt und Experimentation in oligopolistischen Märkten für Erfahrungsgüter]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-13, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "Geographical Indications: The Economics of Claw-Back," IHEID Working Papers 11-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    13. Roe, Brian E. & Sheldon, Ian M., 2001. "The Impacts of Labeling on the Production and Trade of Vertically Differentiated Goods with Process Attributes," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20451, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    14. Chen, Yong & Mak, Barry & Li, Zhou, 2013. "Quality deterioration in package tours: The interplay of asymmetric information and reputation," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 43-54.
    15. Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002. "Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
    16. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019. "The Informational Role of Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
    17. Alessio Emanuele BIONDO, 2011. "High-Tech Products and the Double Adverse Selection: Does Commercial Distribution Worsen Efficiency?," Journal of Knowledge Management, Economics and Information Technology, ScientificPapers.org, vol. 1(7), pages 1-18, December.
    18. Judy E. Scott & Dawn G. Gregg & Jae Hoon Choi, 2015. "Lemon complaints: When online auctions go sour," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 177-191, February.
    19. John Lott, 1987. "Political cheating," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 169-186, January.
    20. Bate, Roger & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Mathur, Aparna, 2011. "Does price reveal poor-quality drugs? Evidence from 17 countries," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1150-1163.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:1:p:207-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.