The marginal price effects of antitrust rules against price discrimination
The two central pricing rules contained in most antitrust laws are prohibitions of below-cost pricing and prohibitions of discriminatory pricing. This article shows that the rule against discriminatory pricing may actually induce firms to charge exclusionary below-cost prices, even in the complete absence of any predatory intent on the part of firms.
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