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A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections

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  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Jungmin Lee

Abstract

This paper examines the role of repetition in government regulation using Florida restaurant inspection data from 2003 to 2010. In the raw data, inspectors new to inspected restaurants tend to report 27 percent more violations than repeat inspectors. After ruling out regulatory capture and endogenous rotation of inspectors as potential explanations, we find that the gap between new and repeat inspections is best explained by the following two effects: first, restaurants target compliance in response to the heterogeneous stringency and preferences of inspectors; second, inspectors pay greater attention in a first visit than in subsequent visits. After controlling for the heterogeneous criteria of inspectors, we find that a new inspector reports 13-18 percent more violations than noted in the second visit of the previous inspector, likely because of a higher level of attention. Counterfactual simulations highlight the importance of inspectors' training and rotation in regulatory outcomes.

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  • Ginger Zhe Jin & Jungmin Lee, 2018. "A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 159-188.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/697682
    DOI: 10.1086/697682
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Philip Makofske, 2020. "The Effect of Information Salience on Product Quality: Louisville Restaurant Hygiene and Yelp.com," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 52-92, March.
    2. Makofske, Matthew Philip, 2019. "Inspection regimes and regulatory compliance: How important is the element of surprise?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 30-34.
    3. Ginger Zhe Jin & Jungmin Lee, 2014. "Inspection technology, detection, and compliance: evidence from Florida restaurant inspections," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 885-917, December.
    4. Justin Marion & Jeremy West, 2024. "Socioeconomic Disparities in Privatized Pollution Remediation: Evidence from Toxic Chemical Spills," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 219-249, July.
    5. Makofske, Matthew Philip, 2021. "Spoiled food and spoiled surprises: Inspection anticipation and regulatory compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 348-365.
    6. D. Mark Anderson & Kerwin Kofi Charles & Michael McKelligott & Daniel I. Rees, 2022. "Safeguarding Consumers Through Minimum Quality Standards: Milk Inspections and Urban Mortality, 1880-1910," NBER Working Papers 30063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Anderson, D. Mark & Charles, Kerwin Kofi & McKelligott, Michael & Rees, Daniel I., 2022. "Safeguarding Consumers through Minimum Quality Standards: Milk Inspections and Urban Mortality, 1880-1910," IZA Discussion Papers 15295, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Kovács, Balázs & Lehman, David W. & Carroll, Glenn R., 2020. "Grade inflation in restaurant hygiene inspections: Repeated interactions between inspectors and restaurateurs," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    9. Matthew P. Makofske, 2024. "Disclosure policy design and regulatory agent behavior," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 106(1), pages 118-144, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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