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Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees

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  • Wang, Ruqu

Abstract

In this article, the author intends to justify the rare use of application fees in labor markets. He analyzes a model in which there is a training or testing period preceding a worker's effective production period. With various commitment abilities of firms, the author finds that application fees are used if and only if all future wages can be committed before a worker applies; otherwise, no application fees will be charged. The model is then modified to explain the positive fees in journal submissions and college admissions. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Ruqu, 1997. "Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 124-142, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:124-42
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lang, Kevin & Kahn, Shulamit, 1990. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment: A Second View," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 296-306, April.
    2. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1990. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment--One View," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 269-295, April.
    3. Sattinger, Michael, 1990. "Unemployment, the Market for Interviews, and Wage Employment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 356-371, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Angrist, Joshua D. & Guryan, Jonathan, 2008. "Does teacher testing raise teacher quality? Evidence from state certification requirements," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 483-503, October.
    2. Damien Besancenot & Kim Huynh & Radu Vranceanu, 2011. "A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 708-725, December.
    3. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
    4. Besancenot Damien & Faria João R. & Huynh Kim V., 2014. "Congestion of Academic Journals Under Papers’ Imperfect Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 1145-1167, July.
    5. Damien Besancenot & Joao Faria & Kim Huynh, 2009. "Congestion in academic journals under an impartial selection process," Working Papers halshs-00382585, HAL.
    6. Fan Yang & Ronald M. Harstad, 2017. "The Welfare Cost of Signaling," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(1), pages 1-21, February.

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