Congestion in academic journals under an impartial selection process
This paper studies the publishing game played by researchers and editors when the editors adopt an impartial selection process. It analyzes the possibility of congestion in the editorial process and shows that, depending on the nature of the equilibrium, the rise of the rejection costs could be an inappropriate solution to avoid the congestion effect.
|Date of creation:||07 May 2009|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00382585v2|
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- Hendrik P. van Dalen, 1999. "The Golden Age of Nobel Economists," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 43(2), pages 19-35, October.
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