Paradigm depletion, knowledge production and research effort
This paper deals with two elements of Thomas Kuhn (1962) ideas regarding paradigm: Depletion and resiliency. The possibility of paradigm depletion taking resilience into account, given the hierarchy among scientists, is modeled as a Stackelberg differential game between editors [leaders] and authors [followers]. A number of results emerge from the model: i) Paradigm depletion can be optimal; ii) The optimal editor's shadow price of potential knowledge must be non-positive, if it is positive, the editor is just a keeper of the orthodoxy rather than a scientist; iii) Editor's and/or researcher's impatience is always bad for science; iv) In equilibrium editor's behavior does not matter for optimal research effort, while only editor's behavior matter for the paradigm.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2009|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00447302|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rajeev K. Goel & João Ricardo Faria, 2007. "Proliferation Of Academic Journals: Effects On Research Quantity And Quality," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 536-549, November.
- Alberto Baccini & Lucio Barabesi, 2008. "Interlocking Editorship. A Network Analysis of the Links Between Economic Journals," Department of Economics University of Siena 532, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Daniel G. Arce & Walter Enders & Gary A. Hoover, 2008. "Plagiarism And Its Impact On The Economics Profession," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 231-243, 07.
- Berg, Nathan & Faria, Joao, 2008. "Negatively correlated author seniority and the number of acknowledged people: Name-recognition as a signal of scientific merit?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1234-1247, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cepnwp:halshs-00447302. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.