Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory
Author
Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or
for a different version of it.Other versions of this item:
- Wayne L. Lee & Anjan V. Thakor & Gautam Vora, 2004. "Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory," Finance 0411023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Talmor, Eli, 1981. "Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 413-435, November.
- Thakor, Anjan V, 1982.
"An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with "Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 717-739, June.
- Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with 'Third Party' Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance," Finance 0411028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stephen A. Ross, 1977. "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
- Allen, Beth E, 1981. "Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1173-1199, September.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975.
"The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Sick, Gordon, 1981. "Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 437-438, November.
- J. Luis Guasch & Andrew Weiss, 1980.
"Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(4), pages 653-664.
- GUASCH, J. Luis & WEISS, Andrew, 1980. "Wages as sorting mechanisms in competitive markets with asymmetric information: a theory of testing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 402, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 259-270, Spring.
- W. Kip Viscusi, 1978. "A Note on "Lemons" Markets with Quality Certification," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 277-279, Spring.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Information and Competitive Price Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 246-253, May.
- Niehans, Jurg & Hewson, John, 1976. "The Eurodollar Market and Monetary Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, February.
- Kraus, Alan & Sick, Gordon A, 1980. "Distinguishing Beliefs and Preferences in Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 335-344, May.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Shah, Salman & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987.
"Optimal capital structure and project financing,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 209-243, August.
- Salman Shah & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Optimal Capital Structure and Project Financing," Finance 0411041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fiset, John & Oldford, Erin & Chu, Shaner, 2021. "Market signaling capacity of written and visual charismatic leadership tactics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C).
- Chaney, Paul K. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1985.
"Incentive effects of benevolent intervention : The case of government loan guarantees,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 169-189, March.
- Paul K. Chaney & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Incentive Effects of Benevolent Intervention - The case of government loan guarantees," Finance 0411047, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Umeair Shahzad & Fukai Luo & Jing Liu, 2023. "Debt financing and technology investment Kuznets curve: Evidence from China," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(1), pages 751-765, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Thakor, Anjan V. & Callaway, Richard, 1983.
"Costly Information Production Equilibria in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to Credit Rationing,"
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 229-256, June.
- Anjan V. Thakor & Richard Callaway, 2004. "Costly Information Production Equilibria in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to Credit Rationing," Finance 0411030, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Darcy W. E. Allen & Jason Potts & Julian Waters-Lynch & Max Parasol, 2024. "Costly Signalling in DAOs," Papers 2406.18457, arXiv.org.
- Thakor, Anjan V, 1982.
"An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with "Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 717-739, June.
- Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with 'Third Party' Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance," Finance 0411028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2021.
"Signalling to Experts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 800-850.
- Florian Scheuer & Pablo Kurlat, 2016. "Signaling to Experts," 2016 Meeting Papers 501, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2017. "Signaling to Experts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6655, CESifo.
- Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2017. "Signaling to Experts," NBER Working Papers 23817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Scheuer, Florian & Kurlat, Pablo, 2017. "Signaling to Experts," CEPR Discussion Papers 12293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
- Reif, Christiane & Rexhäuser, Sascha, 2015. "Good enough! Are socially responsible companies the more successful environmental innovators?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-018, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2017. "The Revolution of Information Economics: The Past and the Future," NBER Working Papers 23780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- J. Barkley Rosser, 2003. "A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The economic contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 3-21.
- Yung-Chuan Lee & Ming-Chang Wang, 2014. "Does the Appointment of Independent Directors Drive Multiple Effects?," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 8(1), pages 69-88.
- Frankfurter, George M. & Wood, Bob Jr., 2002. "Dividend policy theories and their empirical tests," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 111-138.
- Bauchet, Jonathan & Chakravarty, Sugato & Hunter, Brian, 2018. "Separating the wheat from the chaff: Signaling in microfinance loans," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 40-50.
- Babl, Christian & Fausel, Andreas & Kuhlman, Leonard & Schiereck, Dirk, 2014.
"Werteffekte auf Anleiheemissionen: Eine Note für deutsche Emittenten,"
Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(1), pages 8-22.
- Babl, C. & Fausel, A. & Kuhlman, D. & Schiereck, D., 2014. "Werteffekte auf Anleiheemissionen: Eine Note für deutsche Emittenten," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 64838, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Peterson, Steven P., 1996. "Some experimental evidence on the efficiency of dividend signaling in resolving information asymmetries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 373-388, May.
- David Feldman & Charles Trzcinka & Russell Winer, 2015. "Pricing under noisy signaling," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 435-454, August.
- Ricardo J. Rodriguez, 1992. "Quality Dispersion And The Feasibility Of Dividends As Signals," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 15(4), pages 307-315, December.
- Feltovich, N. & Harbaugh, R. & To, T., 1998.
"Too Cool for School? A Theory of Counter signaling,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
518, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Feltovich, Nick & Harbaugh, Rick & To, Ted, 1998. "Too Cool For School? A Theory Of Countersignaling," Economic Research Papers 268800, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998. "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information 9811002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- José Martí Pellón & Marina Balboa, 2003. "Characterisation Of The Reputation Of Private Equity Managers: Evidence In Spain," Working Papers. Serie EC 2003-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Darby, Michael R. & Lott, John Jr., 1989.
"Qualitative information, reputation, and monopolistic competition,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 87-103, June.
- Michael R. Darby & John R. Lott, Jr., 1975. "Qualitative Information, Reputation, and Monopolistic Competition," NBER Working Papers 0095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael R. Darby & John R. Lott, 1982. "Qualitative Information, Reputation and Monopolistic Competition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 265, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Greenwald, Bruce C. & Kohn, Meir & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1990.
"Financial market imperfections and productivity growth,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 321-345, June.
- Greenwald, Bruce C. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1989. "Financial Market Imperfections and Productivity Growth," Working Paper Series 206, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1989. "Financial Market Imperfections and Productivity Growth," NBER Working Papers 2945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Koumenta, Maria & Pagliero, Mario & Rostam-Afschar, Davud, 2022.
"Occupational Regulation, Institutions, and Migrants’ Labor Market Outcomes,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
- Maria Koumenta & Mario Pagliero & Davud Rostam-Afschar, 2022. "Occupational Regulation, Institutions, and Migrants' Labor Market Outcomes," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 685 JEL Classification: J, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Koumenta, Maria & Pagliero, Mario & Rostam-Afschar, Davud, 2022. "Occupational Regulation, Institutions, and Migrants' Labor Market Outcomes," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264033, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Maria Koumenta & Mario Pagliero & Davud Rostam-Afschar, 2022. "Occupational Regulation, Institutions, and Migrants' Labor Market Outcomes," Working Papers 606, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
- Koumenta, Maria & Pagliero, Mario & Rostam-Afschar, Davud, 2022. "Occupational regulation, institutions, and migrants' labor market outcomes," Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 02-2022, University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Koumenta, Maria & Pagliero, Mario & Rostam-Afschar, Davud, 2022. "Occupational Regulation, Institutions, and Migrants' Labor Market Outcomes," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1052, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:38:y:1983:i:5:p:1507-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/afaaaea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.