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Qualitative information, reputation, and monopolistic competition

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  • Darby, Michael R.
  • Lott, John Jr.

Abstract

Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Darby, Michael R. & Lott, John Jr., 1989. "Qualitative information, reputation, and monopolistic competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 87-103, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:9:y:1989:i:1:p:87-103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zucker, Lynne G. & Brewer, Marilynn B. & Darby, Michael R. & Peng, Yusheng, 1994. "Collaboration Structure and Information Dilemmas in Biotechnology: Organizational Boundaries as Trust Production," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt0gd8j9k8, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    2. John R. Lott, 2013. "Principles and standards for the benefit–cost analysis of crime," Chapters, in: Scott O. Farrow & Richard Zerbe, Jr. (ed.), Principles and Standards for Benefit–Cost Analysis, chapter 4, pages 153-171, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, 1995. "Social Construction of Trust to Protect Ideas and Data in Space Science and Geophysics," NBER Working Papers 5373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alexander, Cindy R, 1999. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 489-526, April.

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