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Qualitative Information, Reputation and Monopolistic Competition

  • Michael R. Darby

    (UCLA)

  • John R. Lott

    (UCLA)

Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp265.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 265.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 1982
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:265
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  3. Barzel, Yoram, 1970. "Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1142-49, Sept.-Oct.
  4. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  5. Rothschild, Michael, 1973. "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1283-1308, Nov.-Dec..
  6. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1973. "Where Are We in the Theory of Information?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 31-39, May.
  7. Schmalensee, Richard, 1972. "A Note on Monopolistic Competition and Excess Capacity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(3), pages 586-91, May-June.
  8. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-54, July/Aug..
  9. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  10. Michael R. Darby, 1973. "Entrepreneurships, the Firm, and the General Market Information Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 036, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  12. Ohta, H, 1977. "On the Excess Capacity Controversy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 153-65, April.
  13. George J. Stigler, 1951. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59, pages 185.
  14. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  15. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  16. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
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