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Qualitative Information, Reputation and Monopolistic Competition

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  • Michael R. Darby

    (UCLA)

  • John R. Lott

    (UCLA)

Abstract

Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.
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Suggested Citation

  • Michael R. Darby & John R. Lott, 1982. "Qualitative Information, Reputation and Monopolistic Competition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 265, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:265
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp265.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
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    4. Barzel, Yoram, 1970. "Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1142-1149, Sept.-Oct.
    5. Michael R. Darby, 1973. "Entrepreneurships, the Firm, and the General Market Information Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 036, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    7. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    8. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1973. "Where Are We in the Theory of Information?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 31-39, May.
    9. G. C. Archibald, 1961. "Chamberlin versus Chicago," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 2-28.
    10. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
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    12. George J. Stigler, 1951. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59, pages 185-185.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    14. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    15. Schmalensee, Richard, 1972. "A Note on Monopolistic Competition and Excess Capacity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(3), pages 586-591, May-June.
    16. Ohta, H, 1977. "On the Excess Capacity Controversy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 153-165, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zucker, Lynne G. & Brewer, Marilynn B. & Darby, Michael R. & Peng, Yusheng, 1994. "Collaboration Structure and Information Dilemmas in Biotechnology: Organizational Boundaries as Trust Production," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt0gd8j9k8, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    2. John R. Lott, 2013. "Principles and standards for the benefit–cost analysis of crime," Chapters,in: Principles and Standards for Benefit–Cost Analysis, chapter 4, pages 153-171 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, 1995. "Social Construction of Trust to Protect Ideas and Data in Space Science and Geophysics," NBER Working Papers 5373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alexander, Cindy R, 1999. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 489-526, April.

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