Qualitative Information, Reputation, and Monopolistic Competition
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- Darby, Michael R. & Lott, John Jr., 1989. "Qualitative information, reputation, and monopolistic competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 87-103, June.
- Michael R. Darby & John R. Lott, 1982. "Qualitative Information, Reputation and Monopolistic Competition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 265, UCLA Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Zucker, Lynne G. & Brewer, Marilynn B. & Darby, Michael R. & Peng, Yusheng, 1994.
"Collaboration Structure and Information Dilemmas in Biotechnology: Organizational Boundaries as Trust Production,"
Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series
qt0gd8j9k8, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
- Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby & Marilynn B. Brewer & Yusheng Peng, 1995. "Collaboration Structure and Information Dilemmas in Biotechnology: Organizational Boundaries as Trust Production," NBER Working Papers 5199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John R. Lott, 2013. "Principles and standards for the benefit–cost analysis of crime," Chapters, in: Scott O. Farrow & Richard Zerbe, Jr. (ed.), Principles and Standards for Benefit–Cost Analysis, chapter 4, pages 153-171, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, 1995. "Social Construction of Trust to Protect Ideas and Data in Space Science and Geophysics," NBER Working Papers 5373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alexander, Cindy R, 1999. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 489-526, April.
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