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Cartel identification in spatial markets

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  • Ulrich Blum

Abstract

Im Jahr 2003 wurde die deutsche Zementindustrie wegen vorgeblicher Preis- und Quotenabsprachen mit einer Buße von über 600 Mio. Euro belegt. Im abschließenden gerichtlichen Verfahren des Jahres 2009 wurde die Buße erheblich reduziert, weil das Bundeskartellamt nicht in der Lage war, die Mehrerlöse in der vorgegebenen Höhe nachzuweisen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt anhand des ostdeutschen Zementkartells, das auf Quotenabsprachen aus den neunziger Jahren beruhte und das in Frühjahr 2002 endete, daß dieses ökonomisch nicht wirksam war. Aus Sicht der Beteiligten waren offensichtlich die Kenntnisse der wahren Marktkräfte unbekannt, weshalb das Kartell beibehalten wurde. Auf Grundlage eines räumlichen Ansatzes für die Jahre 1997 bis 2002 wird das regionale Preissetzungsverhalten untersucht. Die ökonometrische Analyse zeigt, daß der Wettbewerb in den Kartelljahren bereits vergleichsweise intensiv war, da Transportkosten und Rabattsysteme verwendet wurden, um Angebote der Marktlage anzupassen. Strategische Importe aus dem Osten ebenso wie Angebote mittelständischer Mahlwerke setzten den Markt unter Druck. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2009

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrich Blum, 2009. "Cartel identification in spatial markets," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 29(2), pages 137-159, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jahrfr:v:29:y:2009:i:2:p:137-159
    DOI: 10.1007/s10037-009-0037-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartel; Antitrust; Excess revenue; Regional demand; Cement; East Germany; L4; L7; C2; R1;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L7 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction
    • C2 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics

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