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Cooperation evolution in random multiplicative environments

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  • G. Yaari

  • S. Solomon

Abstract

Most real life systems have a random component: the multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors influencing them result in stochastic fluctuations of the parameters determining their dynamics. These empirical systems are in many cases subject to noise of multiplicative nature. The special properties of multiplicative noise as opposed to additive noise have been noticed for a long while. Even though apparently and formally the difference between free additive vs. multiplicative random walks consists in just a move from normal to log-normal distributions, in practice the implications are much more far reaching. While in an additive context the emergence and survival of cooperation requires special conditions (especially some level of reward, punishment, reciprocity), we find that in the multiplicative random context the emergence of cooperation is much more natural and effective. We study the various implications of this observation and its applications in various contexts.
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Suggested Citation

  • G. Yaari & S. Solomon, 2010. "Cooperation evolution in random multiplicative environments," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 73(4), pages 625-632, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:73:y:2010:i:4:p:625-632
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2010-00027-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Lorenz & Fabian Paetzel & Frank Schweitzer, 2013. "Redistribution Spurs Growth by Using a Portfolio Effect on Risky Human Capital," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(2), pages 1-13, February.
    2. Stojkoski, Viktor & Karbevski, Marko & Utkovski, Zoran & Basnarkov, Lasko & Kocarev, Ljupco, 2021. "Evolution of cooperation in networked heterogeneous fluctuating environments," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 572(C).
    3. Aoki, Masanao & Hawkins, Raymond J., 2010. "Non-self-averaging and the statistical mechanics of endogenous macroeconomic fluctuations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1543-1546, November.
    4. Liebmann, Thomas & Kassberger, Stefan & Hellmich, Martin, 2017. "Sharing and growth in general random multiplicative environments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(1), pages 193-206.
    5. Jan Lorenz & Fabian Paetzel & Frank Schweitzer, 2012. "Redistribution spurs growth by using a portfolio effect on human capital," Papers 1210.3716, arXiv.org.

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